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Abstract: This dissertation consists of two essays in international macroeconomics. Re-
cent studies have found that once a country achieves a certain minimum level of financial
development threshold, foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive effect on economic
growth. In the first essay, using both linear and nonlinear specifications, I examine whether
this positive effect differs in systematic ways depending on the level of financial development
of a country. The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 62 middle and high income coun-
tries spanning the period 1987-2016. The findings from this paper suggest that at low levels
of financial development, improving domestic financial market conditions have the effect of
enabling host economies maximized the growth benefit of FDI. However, the growth effect of
FDI tends to become negligible as a country becomes more financially developed, suggesting
that more finance is not always better.
The second essay explores the FDI-finance-growth relationship within and across convergence
clubs. For this purpose, I first use the log t regression test for convergence and clustering
proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to examine whether countries converge to a single long
run equilibrium. I find evidence of convergence clustering among two different clubs based on
financial development and four different clubs based on real per capita GDP. In the second
part, I examine whether the growth effect of FDI differs across convergence clubs using the
two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005)
finite sample correction. In addition, I test for threshold effect in the FDI-finance-growth
relationship for each club using a dynamic panel threshold technique. The empirical analysis
is based on a panel of 62 middle and high income countries spanning the period 1987-2016.
Overall, the growth effect of FDI displays substantial heterogeneity across convergence clubs,
appearing to be smaller in clubs with higher average financial development. The results also
point to the presence of threshold effects. The positive effect of FDI on economic growth
kicks in only after a country achieves a minimum level of financial development threshold.
But there is also a financial development threshold beyond which the growth effect of FDI
becomes negligible.
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CHAPTER I
IS MORE FINANCE BETTER? REEXAMINING THE
FDI-FINANCE-GROWTH NEXUS
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an integral part of the financial globalization
process and a key catalyst to economic growth and development. Relative to other types
of international capital flows, FDI is considered less volatile and less prone to reversals,
suggesting that countries may be less vulnerable to reversals of these flows if capital inflows
take the form of FDI. Policymakers, particularly in the developing, emerging, and transition
economies have adopted effective strategies with a variety of preferential incentives aimed
at attracting more FDI, especially following the debt crisis of the 1980s (Alfaro et al., 2004;
Bluedorn et al., 2013). Many host countries have lowered various entry barriers, opened up
new sectors to foreign investments, and provided various forms of investment incentives such
as import duty exemptions and low taxes for foreign investors to encourage foreign owned
companies to invest in their jurisdiction. It is therefore not surprising that the share of FDI
in total capital flows has substantially increased over the past decades (Aitken and Harrison,
1999; Boubakri et al., 2013).
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The strive to attract more FDI inflows stems from the belief that FDI inflows can bring
not only the much-needed additional foreign capital but also new technology and know-how,
new and improved managerial and marketing skills, and horizontal and vertical knowledge
spillovers via backward or forward linkage with local firms. A commonly held belief among
policymakers is that multinational corporations possess intangible productive assets in that
they tend to be relatively more productive, skill and knowledge intensive, and invest in
research and development. As a result, domestic firms will benefit from FDI through transfer
from these multinational firms, that is, the process of technological diffusion (Hermes and
Lensink, 2003; Javorcik, 2004; Kose et al., 2009; Alfaro, 2017; Desbordes and Wei, 2017).
All these potential benefits of FDI inflows can potentially increase productivity and output,
and transform the production structure of the host economy. However, these potential
benefits are not automatic and may also vary across countries. Consequently, understanding
the effects of FDI on the host economy is of considerable interest to policymakers and has
become an important topic in academic and policy research.
A plethora of empirical studies have focused on the effects of FDI on economic growth in
host economies. However, despite the theoretical reasons for expecting FDI to have a positive
effect on economic growth, the empirical evidence at both micro and macro levels remains
ambiguous. At the micro level, spillovers from FDI may affect the productivity of domestic
firms through the horizontal (intra-industry) or vertical (inter-industry) spillover channels
either via the backward or forward linkages between local and foreign firms.1 Empirical micro
studies find both positive and negative productivity spillovers that are more vertical rather
than horizontal in nature. For example, Javorcik (2004) and Blalock and Gertler (2008)
find evidence of positive productivity spillovers from foreign firms to their local upstream
suppliers in Lithuania and Indonesia, respectively. Xu and Sheng (2012) observe, through
forward linkages, FDI has a positive effect on Chinese manufacturing downstream firms.
Using firm-level data from Romania, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) find only projects
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with joint domestic and foreign ownership benefits from vertical spillovers. Other firm- and
industry-level studies such as Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuelan plants and Kathuria
(2000) on Indian manufacturing industry find evidence of negative spillover effects.
Empirical studies at the macro level have also found mixed evidence albeit Lipsey (2002)
observes that, where a significant relation exist, the overall evidence favors positive rather
than negative effect. This reflects Bruno and Campos’s (2013) observation from a review
of 72 macro studies on FDI that 50 percent of the studies find positive growth effect, 11
percent find negative effect while 39 percent find no relationship between FDI and growth.
The consensus in the empirical macro literature is that the positive growth effect of FDI is
conditional on host country policies and environments, including financial sector development
(Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2004, 2010; Azman-Saini et al., 2010), human
capital (Borensztein et al., 1998; Ford et al., 2008), trade openness (Balasubramanyam et al.,
1996; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001), and level of economic development (Blomstrom
et al., 1992). This suggests that FDI and host country characteristics are complementary in
the technological spillover process.
A growing body of literature on the FDI-growth nexus has shown that a developed and
a well-functioning financial sector is an important precondition for a positive growth effects
of FDI (see, for example, Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2004; Azman-Saini et al.,
2010). Spillovers from FDI to local firms are not automatic or costless. The absence of a well-
developed local financial sector can limit a host country’s ability to benefit from potential
spillovers from FDI. Entrepreneurial development and the adoption of best technological
practices associated with FDI crucially depend on the development of the financial sector of
the host country. By reducing the costs of conducting transaction, a well-developed financial
sector ensures capital is allocated to the projects with the highest return, enhancing economic
growth. Empirical evidence from existing studies implicitly suggest that once a host country
achieves the minimum financial development threshold, the positive relation between FDI
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and economic growth monotonically increases with financial development. However, recent
studies on the growth-finance relationship have found that financial development promote
economic growth up to some threshold beyond which the effect of more finance vanishes,
becomes negligible, or turns negative (see, for example, Rioja and Valev, 2004a,b; Shen and
Lee, 2006; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Beck et al., 2014; Herwartz and Walle, 2014; Law
and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015). If a well-functioning financial sector is an important
precondition for a positive growth effect of FDI, then it is also possible that the effect of FDI
on economic growth may vary with the level of financial development of the host country.
Given the relative importance of the financial sector in the FDI-growth nexus, this pa-
per focuses on the complementarities between FDI and the host country’s level of financial
development. I ask two distinct but related questions. First, is the positive relationship
between FDI and economic growth monotonically increasing with the level of financial de-
velopment? Second, is there a financial development threshold beyond which the growth
benefit of FDI becomes negligible, less pronounced or negative? Answers to these questions
can provide insights into how changes in financial conditions in host economies will affect
the growth benefit of FDI. It will also inform policy responses toward attracting more FDI.
In the first part of the empirical investigation, I use a linear dynamic growth model to ex-
amine whether the positive relationship between FDI and economic growth monotonically
increases with the level of financial development. Estimates are obtained using the two-step
system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite
sample correction. In the second part, I test for the existence of a threshold effect in the
FDI-finance-growth relationship using a dynamic panel threshold technique. The empirical
analysis is based on a panel of 62 middle and high income countries spanning the period
1987-2016. Overall, consistent with the “vanishing effect” of financial development, I find
significant and robust evidence of a positive growth effect of FDI; however, the effect tends
to decline as a country becomes more financially developed. There is a financial development
4
threshold beyond which the positive effect of FDI on economic growth becomes negligible,
suggesting that more finance is not always better. Using private credit as a measure of
financial development, the results show that the effect of FDI on economic growth becomes
statistically insignificant when private sector credit to GDP reaches 92.58%.
This paper contributes to the literature on the growth implication of FDI inflows in
at least three major dimensions. The central contribution of this paper is the use of the
dynamic panel threshold method by Kremer et al. (2013) to explore the nonlinear relationship
between FDI, financial development, and economic growth. To the best of my knowledge,
this method which extends the original model by Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen
(2004) to allow for endogenous regressors in a panel setup has not been used to examine
the FDI-finance-growth nexus. Second, unlike studies that test for the minimum threshold,
this paper explores the “too much” finance hypothesis and thus tests for the existence of an
upper financial development threshold effects in the FDI-finance-growth nexus. Finally, this
paper complements the growing literature on structural and policy related conditions that
can affect the relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth. In particular, this
paper adds to this broader literature by showing that as countries increasingly implement
financial sector reforms in part to stimulate FDI inflows, policymakers can expect the effect
of FDI on economic growth to decline as a country becomes more financially developed.
Thus, in the face of rapid financial sector reforms, it is important for policymakers to know
how local financial development policies affect economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of the
data and preliminary evidence; section III describes the methodology. Section IV presents
the empirical results, and section V concludes.
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2. Data and preliminary analysis
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 62 middle and high income countries over the
period 1987-2016. This study focuses on the inflows of FDI to the host economy, therefore, I
use net FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP as a measure of FDI. Net FDI inflows measure the
net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting interest (10 percent or more of voting power)
in an enterprise operating in an economy outside of the investor’s. It is the sum of short-
term and equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long-term capital. Bank-based
financial development measures are used as the measure of financial development.2 In the
finance-growth literature, private credit is the preferred measure of financial development
(see, for example, Levine et al., 2000; Rioja and Valev, 2004a,b; Aghion et al., 2005, 2009).
Thus, domestic credit to private sector as a percentage to GDP (hereafter private credit) is
used as the primary measure of financial development. To provide a more nuanced view of the
FDI-finance-growth relationship, I use three other measures: domestic credit to private sector
by banks as a percentage of GDP (hereafter bank credit), liquid liabilities as a percentage of
GDP, and a new broad-based index of financial development developed by the IMF namely,
financial institution index (Sahay et al., 2015).3 Private credit and bank credit are obtained
from the World Banks World Development Indicators database. The growth of real GDP
per capita in constant 2010 dollars is used as a measure of growth rate of output.
The control variables are the initial level of real GDP per capita to control for the con-
vergence effect in the standard growth theory; average years of education completed among
people over age 25 to control for the level of human capital in the country; the government
size (government consumption/GDP), the CPI-based average inflation rate, and openness
to trade ((exports+import)/GDP) as controls for policy in the country. Large government
size and high inflation rate are presumed to negatively affect growth, while trade openness
affects growth positively. Domestic investment is also included for further robustness check.
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All the control variables, FDI inflows and domestic investment are extracted from the World
Banks World Development Indicators. The average years of schooling data are obtained
from Barro and Lee (2013) Educational Attainment Data.
As is now standard in the cross-country growth literature, to filter out cyclical fluctuations
and to focus on long-run growth, the data are averaged over 3-year non-overlapping periods4
so there are ten observations per country. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all
the variables. In the preliminary discussion, I focus on the main variables of interest: private
credit, FDI, and growth. As shown in Table 1, there is substantial variation in private credit
across countries, ranging from 2.3 percent in Sudan to 268.3 percent in Iceland; economic
growth ranges from -7.4 percent in Cameroon to 10.8 percent in Botswana. FDI as a share
of GDP also ranges extensively, from -5.8 percent in Panama to 56.7 percent in Netherlands.
To provide context for the analysis, countries are ranked according to their average level
of financial development measured by private credit over the sample period, and then split
into bottom half and top half subsamples.5 Figure 1 plots the average FDI as a share
of GDP over the sample period against the average private credit over the sample period
for the full, bottom half, and top half samples. As shown in Figure 1, there is clearly a
positive relationship between the two variables in both the full sample and the bottom half
subsample. However, there appears to be no relationship between average FDI and average
private credit in the top half subsample. Table 2 also shows the cross-country correlation
among the main variables for the full, top half, and bottom half samples. Overall, there
is a positive correlation between FDI and private credit. However, the correlation appears
stronger and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the bottom half subsample but
relatively weaker in the top half subsample.
The results in Figure 1 and Table 2 represent preliminary evidence that the relationship
between FDI and financial development vary with the level of financial development. If
financial development plays a role in mediating the potential growth benefit of FDI, then
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one can expect countries with the same levels of FDI to experience different growth effect;
the growth effect of FDI will vary with the level of financial development. The goal of this
paper is to examine the robustness of these findings.
3. Econometric methodology
The empirical investigations are of two parts. In the first part, I use a linear dynamic growth
model to examine whether the positive relationship between FDI and economic growth mono-
tonically increases or decreases with the level of financial development. The second part
involves the use of dynamic panel threshold model to test for the existence of a threshold
effect in the FDI-finance-growth relationship.
3.1. Linear dynamic model
In this section, I use split-sample regressions to test for potential differences in coefficients
across subsamples and an interaction analysis to examine how the growth effect of FDI varies
with the level of financial development of a country.
3.1.1. Split-sample regressions
As a starting exercise, I split the sample into bottom half and top half subsamples according
to their average level of financial development, and then estimate split-sample regressions to
test for potential coefficient changes across subsamples. Within each group of countries, I
estimate the following cross-country growth equation:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α− 1)yi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + µi + εi,t. (1)
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where yi,t is the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, and Xi,t is a set of
explanatory variables, including FDI, average years of schooling, government consumption
expenditure, inflation rate, and trade openness, µi represents time invariant country-specific
effect, and εi,t denotes the idiosyncratic shocks.
6 All variables, with the exception of in-
flation, are transformed into logarithms. “Too much” finance implies that the estimated
coefficient for FDI will be less positive in the top half subsample. To obtain asymptotically
efficient estimates of the effect of FDI on growth, I use the system dynamic panel GMM es-
timator by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).7 This dynamic panel
estimator has a number of advantages over pure cross-sectional estimators. First, the sys-
tem dynamic panel GMM estimator addresses the potential endogeneity of all explanatory
variables. Second, it accounts for the biases induced by including lagged or initial income
in the growth equation. Third, unlike pure cross-sectional instrumental variable estimators,
the system GMM estimator exploits the time series variation and controls for unobserved
country-specific effect.
Rewrite Equation (1) as
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + µi + εi,t. (2)
To eliminate the unobserved country-specific effects, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano
and Bond (1991) suggest to first-difference Equation (2) as follows:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β′(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (εi,t − εi,t−1). (3)
By construction, in Equation (3), the differenced lagged dependent variable (yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)
is correlated with the new error term (εi,t − εi,t−1). The former contains yi,t−1 and the
latter, now an MA(1) process, contains εi,t−1. To address this correlation and the potential
9
endogeneity of the explanatory variables, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using the lagged
levels of the explanatory variables as instruments under the assumptions that the error term,
ε, is not serially correlated and the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous.8 Under
these assumptions, this dynamic panel estimator, commonly referred to as difference GMM
estimator, uses the following moment conditions:
E[yi,t−l(εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, . . . , T. (4)
E[Xi,t−l(εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, . . . , T. (5)
The difference GMM estimator, however, has conceptual and statistical shortcomings.
For example, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) demon-
strated that persistence in the lagged dependent and explanatory variables makes lagged
levels of these variables weak instruments for the differenced variables and this may ad-
versely affect the small-sample and asymptotic properties of the difference GMM estimator.
To address this weak instrument problem and to improve efficiency, Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the system GMM estimator. The system
GMM estimator augments the difference estimator by jointly estimating the regressions in
differences and levels. The two equations are distinctly instrumented. While the instruments
for the regression in differences are the lagged levels of the explanatory variables (same as
above), the instruments for the equation in levels are the lagged differences of the explanatory
variables.
These instruments are valid under the additional assumption that the correlation between
the country-specific effect, µi, and the levels of the explanatory variables is time-invariant
such that
E[yi,t+pµi] = E[yi,t+qµi] and E[Xi,t+pµi] = E[Xi,t+qµi] for all p and q. (6)
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Given this assumption, there is no correlation between the country-specific effect, µi, and
the differences of the explanatory variables. This assumption implies, for example, that any
correlation between FDI or financial development and the country-specific effect is constant
over time. Thus, the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are valid instruments
for the equation in levels, and the additional moment conditions for the regression in levels
are:
E[(yi,t−l − yi,t−l−1)(µi + εi,t)] = 0 for l = 1, (7)
E[(Xi,t−l −Xi,t−l−1)(µi + εi,t)] = 0 for l = 1. (8)
The system GMM thus consists of regressions in differences and levels stacked together.
The system GMM estimator uses the moment conditions in Equations (4), (5), (7) and (8) to
obtain consistent and efficient estimates. The moment conditions in Equations (4) and (5) are
used in the first part of the system (regressions in differences) while the moment conditions
in Equations (7) and (8) are used in the second part of the system (regressions in levels). As
with other GMM estimators, the system GMM have one- and two-step variants. Although
asymptotically more efficient and robust to heteroscedasticity, the two-step system GMM
estimation of the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased in finite samples. To
eliminate this potential bias, I use the finite sample correction for the two-step covariance
matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).9
The consistency of the system GMM estimator relies on the validity of the instruments
and the assumption that the error term, ε, is not serially correlated. Although, by construc-
tion, the residuals in first differences, AR(1), are likely to be serially correlated, there should
be no second-order, AR(2), serial correlation. I use two specification tests proposed by Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to test these two assumptions. Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions is used to test the overall validity of the instruments.10
The second test examines the hypothesis that the differenced error term is not second-order
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serially correlated.1112 Also, Roodman (2009) observed that instrument proliferation can
result in biased parameter estimates. To reduce this instrument count problem, I “collapse”
the instrument matrix in order to keep the number of instruments far below the number
of countries.13 In summary, I estimate the cross-country growth model using the two-step
system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance
matrix.
3.1.2. Interaction analysis
As an alternative to the split-sample regressions, I form a linear interaction term between
FDI and financial development and use it as a regressor to test whether the coefficient of
FDI depends on the level of financial development of a country. Separate FDI from the set
of explanatory variables and rewrite Equation (1) as follows:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α− 1)yi,t−1 + δFDIi,t + β′Xi,t + µi + εi,t. (9)
Let the coefficient of FDI, δ, depends on the level of financial development of a country so
that
δ = γ1 + γ2FDi,t (10)
where FDi,t is a measure of financial development. Substitute Equation (10) into Equa-
tion (9) to get
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α− 1)yi,t−1 + γ1FDIi,t + γ2FDIi,t ∗ FDi,t + β′Xi,t + µi + εi,t. (11)
Equation (11) is a standard growth regression augmented with the interaction term, FDIi,t∗
FDi,t. The hypothesis is that γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0 so that the growth effect of FDI, γ1 + γ2 ∗
FDi,t, is lower at high levels of financial development. Equation (11) is also estimated using
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the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction for
the covariance matrix.
3.2. Dynamic panel threshold model
In the split-sample regressions, the sample is divided in a rather ad hoc fashion. However,
because the appropriate threshold level is not known a priori, results from split-sample
regressions may be sensitive to the cut-off value. On the other hand, the linear interaction
model places a priori restriction that the growth effect of FDI monotonically increases or
decreases with financial development. For these reasons, I use the dynamic panel threshold
method by Kremer et al. (2013) to test for the existence of a threshold effect in the FDI-
growth relationship.14 This method extends the original model by Hansen (1999) and Caner
and Hansen (2004) to allow for endogenous regressors in a panel framework.
If financial development plays a role in mediating the growth effect of FDI, regression
functions will not be identical across all countries. With no prior knowledge of the cut-off
values, rather than arbitrarily assuming cut-off values, appropriate threshold level of financial
development is estimated using the dynamic panel threshold method. The dynamic panel
threshold model of the FDI-finance-growth nexus takes the following form:
Growth = µi + β1FDIi,tI(FINi,t ≤ γ) + δI(FINi,t ≤ γ)
+ β2FDIi,tI(FINi,t > γ) + ψ
′Xi,t + εi,t
(12)
where Growth is the growth rate of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, µi is the
country-specific fixed effect, γ is the threshold level, and the error term is εi,t
i.i.d∼ (0, σ2).
I(·) is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if the argument in the indicator function
holds, and 0 otherwise. The threshold variable, FINi,t, divides the sample into regimes
with differing regression slope parameters β1 and β2. The level of financial development
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measured by either private credit, bank credit, liquid liabilities, or financial institution index
is used as the threshold variable. Xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables which can be
partitioned into a subset of exogenous variables (X1i,t = schooling, government expenditure,
inflation rate, trade openness) uncorrelated with εi,t, and a subset of endogenous variable
(X2i,t = real per capita GDP from previous period) correlated with εi,t. Allowing for
differences in the regime intercept helps minimize any potential bias in both the threshold
and the corresponding marginal effect estimates. Following Bick (2010), I include a threshold
intercept, δ.15 All variables, with the exception of inflation and growth, are transformed into
logarithms.
Since the threshold level, γ, is not known a priori, it must be estimated. The esti-
mation procedure involves eliminating the country-specific fixed effects µi using a fixed-
effect transformation method. In a dynamic panel threshold model, however, the traditional
within-transformation and first differencing methods of removing individual effects leads to
inconsistent estimates as it violates the distributional assumptions underlying the threshold
model by Hansen (1999). Thus, the forward orthogonal deviations transformation method
by Arellano and Bover (1995) is used to eliminate the country-specific fixed effects.16 The
estimation procedure by Caner and Hansen (2004) can now be applied to Equation (12).17
Following Caner and Hansen (2004), the parameters are estimated sequentially. First, I
run a reduced-form regression of the endogenous variable X2,it on a set of instruments Z1,it,
including all exogenous regressors X1i,t. I then obtain the predicted values Xˆ2,it. Second,
in Equation (12), I replace X2,it with Xˆ2,it and then obtain the least square estimates for a
fixed threshold γ. Let S(γ) denote the resulting sum of squared residuals. For a strict subset
of the support of FINi,t, I repeat this second step. Observe that, since the slope parameters
depend on the threshold value, the sum of squared errors (SSE) for Equation (12) which is
also a function of the threshold value is a step function, with the steps occurring at some
well-defined values of the threshold variable FINi,t. Conditioning on a threshold value,
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however, SSE is linear in the parameters and minimization will yield the conditional OLS
estimates for β1 and β2. Finally, the estimator of the threshold corresponds to the value of
γ that produces the smallest sum of squared residuals. That is, the minimizer of the sum of
squared residuals: γˆ = argmin
γ
Sn(γ).
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Let C(α) be the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio
statistic LR(γ), then the critical values for determining the 95 percent confidence interval
of the threshold value are given by Γ = {γ : LR(γ) ≤ C(α)} (Hansen, 1999; Caner and
Hansen, 2004). Once the sample-splitting threshold estimate γˆ is obtained, the sample can
be divided into subsamples and, on each subsample, the slope parameters β1 and β2 can
be estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM). Lags of the dependent variable
are used as instruments. Given the bias-efficiency tradeoff in finite sample, empirical results
based on GMM may depend on the number of instruments (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman,
2009). Therefore, in estimation, I use different lag lengths. To avoid potential overfitting,
I use a lag length of one, and to increase efficiency, I use all available lags as instruments.
However, the choice of instruments did not have any significant effect on the main results.
In the results reported in this paper, I use an instrument count of two.
4. Empirical results
The results from the linear and dynamic panel threshold models are discussed in turn.
4.1. Linear dynamic model
In a pure cross-sectional analysis, Alfaro et al. (2004) find no significant direct effect of FDI
on growth. Their sample consisted of only 28 percent developed countries so it is more
likely that most of the countries in their sample have not achieved the minimum level of
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financial development threshold. The authors conjectured that the result could be driven
by the composition of the sample. When they interact FDI with financial development
measures, the interaction term turns out to be positive and significant. Similarly, Rioja and
Valev (2004a) observe finance has positive effect on growth when private credit to GDP is
greater than 14 percent. These findings suggest that FDI can have direct effect on growth
in countries where the financial markets are well-developed.
In this paper, the sample consist of only middle and high income countries. Over the
sample period, 58 out of 62 countries (94%) have an average level of private credit to GDP
exceeding 14 percent so I would expect FDI to have a direct effect on growth. To test this
proposition and to have reference for comparison to estimates using subsamples, for both
the full sample and subsamples, I estimate Equation (1) using the two-step system GMM
estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. Table 3 presents these results
using 3-year averages.19
As shown in column (1) of Table 3, the estimated coefficient of FDI is positive and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that FDI has direct positive effect
on growth. Columns (2) and (3) show the results for the top half and bottom half subsamples,
respectively. The estimated coefficients of FDI for both subsamples are significantly positive.
However, the coefficient of FDI is substantially lower in the top half subsample than in the
bottom half. Also, relative to the full sample, the growth effect of FDI in the bottom half
sample is larger in magnitude but smaller in the top half. Columns (4),(5), and (6) show
the results using three groups: the top, middle, and bottom third subsamples. Similar to
the results from the two-way split, the estimated coefficient of FDI decreases as we move
up from the bottom third to the top third. In the top third, the coefficient of FDI is not
significantly different from zero. The FDI coefficient for the bottom third (0.321), however,
is significantly positive and larger in magnitude than that in the middle third (0.231).
If the growth effect of FDI tends to decline with higher levels of financial development,
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one would expect to observe similar pattern between middle and high income countries, with
the estimated effect being larger in the middle income subsample of countries.20 Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 4 show the results of the differential effect in middle and high income
countries. Consistent with the previous results, the estimated coefficient is larger in middle
income countries than it is in high income countries. Overall, the split-sample regressions
provide evidence of potential nonlinearity in the FDI-finance-growth relationship.
Turning to the interaction analysis, the last three columns of Table 4 present the esti-
mation results from Equation (11). As shown in column (3), the interaction between FDI
and private credit turns out to be negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level,
leading to the conclusion that the growth effect of FDI declines with increased financial de-
velopment. To see how the results are robust to different measures of financial development,
columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 show the results using bank credit and liquid liabilities as
a financial development measures, respectively. The results are identical to the case where
private credit is used as a measure of financial development; the interaction term turns out
to be negative and significant. Thus, more finance is not always better. Moreover, the re-
sults provide additional evidence supporting potential financial development threshold effect
given that, in columns (3), (4), and (5), the coefficient of FDI and the interaction term
have opposite signs. As indicated by the F-statistic for FDI, the coefficient of FDI and the
interaction term are jointly significant at the 5 percent level in all cases.
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, in all subsamples and specifications, the estimated coef-
ficient of initial income is negative. This is consistent with β-convergence. All the other
explanatory variables have the expected sign whenever significant. Also, the Arellano-Bond
serial correlation test shows that there is no second-order serial correlation while the Hansen
instrument validity test shows that the instruments are not correlated with the error term.
In summary, the results based on the split-sample regressions and the interaction anal-
ysis bear out the possibility of nonlinearity in the FDI-finance-growth relationship. The
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interaction between FDI and financial development displays nonlinearity. The implication
is that the more financially developed a country is, the effect of FDI on growth appears
to be smaller. These findings are consistent with the declining growth effect of financial
development reported in the literature (see, for example, Rioja and Valev, 2004a,b; Aghion
et al., 2005; Shen and Lee, 2006; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2015).
4.2. Dynamic panel threshold model
Although the split-sample regressions and the interaction analysis appear informative, each
has shortcomings. For example, the linear interaction model places a priori restriction that
the growth effect of FDI monotonically increases or decreases with financial development.
In the split-sample regressions, the sample is divided in a rather ad hoc fashion and hence
standard asymptotic confidence intervals as well as the chi-square approximation may be
inaccurate (Hansen, 2000). For these reasons, I test for the existence of a threshold effect in
the FDI-growth relationship using a dynamic panel threshold model. Table 5 presents the
estimates from the dynamic panel threshold model (Equation (12)).
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the benchmark results where the financial development
measure, private credit, is used as the threshold variable. The first row displays the esti-
mated financial development threshold values and the corresponding 95 percent confidence
intervals. The slope parameters estimates, βˆ1 and βˆ2, denote the regime-dependent marginal
effects of FDI on growth. The point estimate of the threshold value is 92.58% of GDP.21
Approximately 25 percent of the observations in the sample are above this threshold value;
17 countries have average private credit over the sample period exceeding the threshold value
of 92.58 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval for the threshold is [83.75, 97.49]. The
literature on the FDI-finance-growth relationship has not considered the upper financial de-
velopment threshold effect, thus limiting comparisons. However, the threshold value of 92.58
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percent is close to the threshold estimates in the finance-growth literature (see, for example,
Arcand et al., 2015; Law and Singh, 2014). With respect to the regime-dependent marginal
effects, FDI has significantly positive effect on economic growth if private credit is less than
the threshold value. Above the threshold, however, the effect of FDI is not statistically
significant. Initial income, schooling, and all the “policy” covariates are either significant
and plausibly signed or insignificant.
To provide a more nuanced view, the last three columns of Table 5 present estimates
using bank credit, liquid liabilities, and financial institution index as alternative measures of
financial development, respectively. The results are qualitatively similar. Unlike the other
three measures, when liquid liabilities is used as the measure of financial development, the
effect of FDI is statistically significant both above and below the threshold value. However,
consistent with the diminishing returns effect of financial development, the effect is relatively
smaller when liquid liabilities exceeds the threshold level. To examine the sensitivity of the
benchmark results, following Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2000), I re-estimate the
model using a “simple” conditioning set that includes only the logarithm of initial income
and educational attainment. The results are reported in Table 6. The results remain robust.
In particular, the point estimate of the threshold value and the marginal effects are similar
to the benchmark results. In summary, the empirical findings are robust to alternative
conditioning sets and measures of financial development.
The picture that emerges from the empirical findings is that there is a financial develop-
ment threshold effect in the FDI-finance-growth relationship; the growth effect of FDI tends
to decline as a country becomes more financially developed. These findings are robust to
alternative conditioning sets, estimation procedures, and measures of financial development.
They are also consistent with the “vanishing effect” of financial development (see, for ex-
ample, Rioja and Valev, 2004a,b; Shen and Lee, 2006; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Beck
et al., 2014; Herwartz and Walle, 2014; Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015); there is
19
a threshold beyond which the positive effect of FDI on economic growth becomes negligible,
suggesting that more finance is not always better.
5. Conclusion
Empirical studies on FDI and economic growth relationship have found that once a country
achieves a certain minimum level of financial development threshold, FDI has a positive
effect on economic growth. In this paper, I examine whether this positive effect differs in
systematic ways depending on the level of financial development of a country. I ask two
distinct but related questions. First, is the positive relationship between FDI and economic
growth monotonically increasing with the level of financial development? Second, is there a
financial development threshold beyond which the growth benefit of FDI becomes negligible,
less pronounced or negative? The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 62 middle and
high income countries spanning the period 1987-2016.
In the first part of the empirical investigation, I use linear dynamic growth model to
examine whether the positive relationship between FDI and economic growth monotonically
increases or decreases with the level of financial development. I use split-sample regressions
to test for potential differences in coefficients across subsamples and an interaction analysis
to examine how the growth effect of FDI varies with the level of financial development of
a country. Estimates are obtained using two-step system generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. The second part in-
volves the use of a dynamic panel threshold model to test for the existence of threshold effect
in the FDI-finance-growth relationship. A central contribution of this paper is the adoption
of the dynamic panel threshold method by Kremer et al. (2013) to explore the nonlinear
relationship between FDI, financial development, and growth. The dynamic panel thresh-
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old model allows endogenous test for the existence of threshold effect in the FDI-growth
relationship without imposing any specific functional form or arbitrary data splitting.
I find significant and robust evidence of a positive growth effect of FDI, however, the ef-
fect tends to decline as a country becomes more financially developed, suggesting a threshold
effect in the FDI-finance-growth relationship. Using private credit as a measure of financial
development, the results show that the effect of FDI on economic growth becomes statis-
tically insignificant when private sector credit to GDP reaches 92.58 percent. This paper
adds to the broader literature on structural and policy related conditions that can affect
the relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth by showing that as countries in-
creasingly implement financial sector reforms in part to stimulate FDI inflows, policymakers
can expect the effect of FDI on economic growth to become negligible as a country becomes
more financially developed.
Overall, the findings from this paper suggest that at low levels of financial development,
improving domestic financial market conditions have the effect of enabling host economies
maximized the growth benefit of FDI. However, the growth effect of FDI tends to become
negligible as a country becomes more financially developed, suggesting that more finance
is not always better. Thus, in the face of rapid financial market reform, it is imperative
for policymakers especially, in developing, emerging, and transition economies, to know how
financial development policies affect economic growth. Also, to accurately examine the role
of financial development in mediating the potential growth benefit of FDI, it is important
for researchers to allow for cross-country differences in financial development.
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CHAPTER II
HETEROGENEITY AND NONLINEARITY IN THE
FDI-FINANCE-GROWTH NEXUS: EVIDENCE FROM
CONVERGENCE CLUBS
1. Introduction
The role of financial development in the foreign direct investment (FDI)-growth nexus has
become an important topic in academic and policy research. Starting from the seminal
contribution of Alfaro et al. (2004), a large body of empirical studies has focused on the
growth benefit of FDI in the host economy and the role of local financial development in
mediating this potential benefit (see, for example, Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Alfaro et al.,
2010; Azman-Saini et al., 2010; Alfaro, 2017). Findings from these studies show countries
with well-developed financial sector gain significantly from FDI inflows. In addition, local
financial sector development affects the locational decisions of multinational corporations.
For example, it has been observed that, through the financing effect, host countries with
well-functioning financial sector attract more multinational affiliates. The level of financial
development in a host country can also affect the scale of operation of multinational firms.22
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However, when local financial institutions are underdeveloped, host-country financing is
often insufficient, costly, and of shorter duration, serving as a deterrent to multinational
corporations seeking to establish a local affiliate (Bilir et al., 2014).
Many host countries have undergone financial sector reforms such as relaxing restrictions
on foreign bank entry and cross-border bank alliances in part to attract more FDI inflows.
They have increasingly offered investment incentives to encourage foreign firms invest in
their jurisdiction (Alfaro et al., 2004; Bluedorn et al., 2013; Alfaro, 2017). A commonly
held belief among policymakers, particularly in the developing, emerging, and transition
economies is that FDI generates positive effects for host countries. In addition to the direct
capital financing it supplies, FDI inflows can bring new technology and know-how, new and
improved managerial and marketing skills while promoting backward and forward linkages
with local firms. These potential benefits of FDI can play a significant role in promoting
economic growth and development of a host country.
Given the panoply of potential benefits of FDI inflows, a plethora of empirical studies have
focused on the effects of FDI on economic growth in host economies. Theoretical benefits
notwithstanding, empirical studies on the growth effect of FDI at both micro and macro levels
find mixed evidence.23 Given the mixed empirical evidence, coupled with the many incentives
offered to foreign firms, understanding the factors that affect the locational decisions of
multinational firms and the conditions under which host economies benefit from FDI are of
considerable interest to policymakers. The consensus in the empirical literature is that the
growth benefit of FDI is not automatic but conditional. At the micro level, the growth benefit
of FDI depends on the type of linkage (backward or forward)24 while at the macro level,
it depends on the host country policies and environments, including local financial sector
development, trade openness, and the level of economic and human capital development.
Given the appropriate host country policies and environments, a preponderance of studies
have shown that FDI inflows can increase productivity, assist human capital formation,
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create a more competitive business environment, and transform the production structure of
the host economy(see, for example, Blomstrom et al., 1992; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold,
2001; Hermes and Lensink, 2003; Javorcik, 2004; Alfaro et al., 2004).
The goal of this paper is to shed light on the potential heterogeneity and nonlinearity
in the FDI-finance-growth nexus. For this purpose, I first explore whether the relationship
between FDI and economic growth is significantly positive and whether the effect differs
across more homogenous group of countries. Second, within each homogenous group of
countries, I ask whether there is a common financial development threshold beyond which
the positive effect of FDI on economic growth changes in magnitude.
The empirical investigation is twofold. First, I apply the log t regression test for con-
vergence and clustering proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to examine whether countries
converge to a single long run equilibrium or whether there exist multiple equilibria (conver-
gence clubs) in terms of real per capita GDP and financial development. Results based on
the convergence test suggest that all the countries in the sample do not converge to a single
long run equilibrium. However, there is some evidence of convergence clustering among two
different clubs based on private credit, a measure of financial development, and four differ-
ent clubs based on real per capita GDP.25 In the second part, for each convergence club, I
use a linear dynamic growth model to examine the relationship between FDI and economic
growth. Estimates are obtained using the two-step system generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. In addition, I test for
threshold effect in the FDI-finance-growth relationship for each club using a dynamic panel
threshold technique by Kremer et al. (2013). The empirical analysis is based on a panel of
62 middle and high income countries spanning the period 1987-2016.
Overall, the empirical results suggest the possibility of heterogeneity and nonlinearity in
the FDI-finance-growth nexus. The growth effect of FDI displays substantial heterogeneity
across convergence clubs, appearing to be smaller in clubs with higher average financial
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development. The results also point to the presence of threshold effects. The positive effect
of FDI on economic growth kicks in only after a country achieves a minimum level of financial
development threshold. But there is also a threshold beyond which the growth effect of FDI
becomes negligible. These results are consistent with the diminishing returns effects in the
development of financial sector. While, in this paper, I test for possible structural breaks
in terms of the level of financial development, I do not examine the channels through which
the nonlinear relationship occurs.
This paper makes the following contributions to the empirical literature on growth im-
plication of FDI inflows. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to explore
heterogeneity and nonlinearity in the FDI-finance-growth relationship within and across con-
vergence clubs. Existing FDI-related studies focus on conventional classification of countries
or sample splitting based on income levels, level of financial development, and geography
to examine heterogeneity. Unlike these studies, however, the time varying nonlinear factor
model-based convergence test and the algorithm used to cluster countries into convergence
clubs in this paper allows for transitional dynamics and individual heterogeneity, thus avoid-
ing ad hoc sample splitting. I find that club members are not necessarily geographically
neighboring, and neither does income convergence necessarily imply financial development
convergence. Second, by grouping countries into convergence clubs based on financial de-
velopment, this paper tests for the existence of both lower and upper financial development
threshold effects. Previous studies usually focus on the minimum threshold. Third, this
paper is one of the first papers to use a dynamic panel threshold method to explore the
nonlinear relationship between FDI, financial development and economic growth. Finally,
this paper contributes to the growing literature on structural and policy related conditions
that can affect the relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth by showing that
heterogeneity and nonlinearity matter in the relationship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of the
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data and preliminary evidence; section III describes the methodology. Section IV presents
the empirical results, and section V concludes.
2. Data
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 62 middle and high income countries over the
period 1987-2016. I use net FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP as a measure of FDI since
this paper focuses on the inflows of FDI to the host economy.26 Net FDI inflow is the sum
of short-term and equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long-term capital. I
use Bank-based financial development measures as the measure of financial development.27
In the finance-growth literature, private credit as a percentage of GDP is the preferred
measure of financial development (see, for example, Levine et al., 2000; Rioja and Valev,
2004a; Aghion et al., 2005, 2009). Thus, domestic credit to private sector as a percentage
of GDP (hereafter private credit) is used as the primary measure of financial development.
Private credit is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
The growth of real GDP per capita in constant 2010 dollars is used as a measure of growth
rate of output.
As control variables, following the literature, I include initial level of real GDP per capita
to control for the convergence effect in the standard growth theory; average years of education
completed among people age 25 and over to control for the level of human capital in the
country; government size (government consumption/GDP), CPI-based average inflation rate,
and openness to trade ((exports+import)/GDP) as controls for policy in the country. Large
government size and high inflation rate are presumed to negatively affect growth, while trade
openness affects growth positively. All the control variables and FDI inflows are extracted
from the World Banks World Development Indicators. The average years of schooling data
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are obtained from Barro and Lee (2013) series.
Following the literature, I use annual data for the log t regression test for convergence
and clustering. However, to explore the FDI-finance-growth relationship within and across
convergence clubs, the data are averaged over 3-year non-overlapping periods so there are
ten observations per country.28 This is standard in the cross-country growth literature and
is done to filter out cyclical fluctuations and to focus on long-run growth.
3. Econometric methodology
The empirical investigations are of two parts. In the first part, I apply the log t regression
test for convergence and clustering proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to examine whether
countries converge to a single long run equilibrium or whether there exist multiple equilibria
(convergence clubs) in terms of real per capita GDP and financial development. In the
second part, I explore the FDI-finance-growth relationship within and across convergence
clubs.
3.1. Convergence tests
In this section, I first review the conventional β-convergence test and the potential short-
comings associated with it. Next, I describe the log t regression test for convergence and
clustering proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) in the context of a time varying nonlinear
factor model.
3.1.1. β-convergence test
As a preliminary exercise to the convergence analysis, I examine whether the speed of conver-
gence parameter is positive or negative by regressing the average growth rate of y = {private
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credit, real per capita GDP} on its initial value. That is, I examine whether areas with low
initial financial development measured by private credit or low initial real per capita GDP
tend to experience faster growth rates in financial development and real per capita GDP,
respectively. This is the conventional β-convergence test. A negative relationship between
the average growth rate of y = {private credit, real per capita GDP} and its initial level
implies β-convergence.
The left panel of Figure 2 shows the relationship between initial log private credit and
average growth rate of private credit for the full sample. If all countries are converging
overtime, the scatter plot would show a strong negative association between initial log private
credit and the average growth rate of private credit.29 When the sample is divided into
bottom half (circle-shaped) and top half (triangle-shaped) subsamples according to their
average level of financial development, the negative association becomes relatively stronger,
suggesting the possibility of a weak form of regional catch-up. Similarly, in the right panel
of Figure 2, relative to the full sample, the negative relationship between initial log real per
capita GDP and average growth rate of real per capita GDP appears more pronounced in
the middle and high income subsamples.30
The results in Figure 2 represent preliminary evidence that countries in the sample may
generally diverge in terms of private credit and real per capita GDP; countries in a subgroup
that have similar characteristics tend to converge to their own steady state. The problem
with using the conventional β-convergence test for club convergence is that the subgroups
of countries have to be determined a priori. Moreover, the test works under homogeneity of
technology progress. However, as observed by Phillips and Sul (2009), under conditions of
transitional heterogeneity, estimation of the convergence parameter may be bias and incon-
sistent so negative estimates cannot be directly taken as evidence of growth convergence. In
this paper, I use time varying nonlinear factor model that incorporates transitional dynamics
and individual heterogeneity.
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3.1.2. The log t test
Let yi,t be the log private credit or log real per capita GDP of country i at time t. To analyze
the transitional dynamics of yi,t, I apply a regression-based convergence test developed by
Phillips and Sul (2007). This log t regression test is based on a nonlinear time-varying factor
model. As a starting point of the model, the panel data yi,t is decomposed as
yi,t = gi,t + ai,t, (13)
where gi,t denotes the systematic components including permanent common components and
ai,t represents transitory components. It is possible that the elements gi,t and ai,t may contain
a combination of common and idiosyncratic components. In order to isolate common from
idiosyncratic components in the panel, Equation (13) is transformed as
yi,t =
(
gi,t + ai,t
µt
)
µt = δi,tµt for all i and t, (14)
where µt is a single common component capturing some deterministic or stochastically trend-
ing behavior and δi,t is a time varying idiosyncratic element measuring the idiosyncratic
distance between the common trend component, µt, and yi,t. For any two series yi,t and yj,t,
Phillips and Sul (2007) define relative convergence in terms of their ratio so that relative
convergence exists among the yi,t if
lim
t→∞
yi,t
yj,t
= 1 for all i and j. (15)
In terms of Equation (14), this condition is equivalent to convergence of the factor loading
coefficients
lim
t→∞
δi,t = δ for all i. (16)
29
In the general case of Equation (14), since the total number of unknowns is greater
than the number of observations in the panel, it is impossible to estimate the time varying
loading coefficients, δi,t, directly unless some structural restrictions are imposed on δi,t and
µt. As a result, Phillips and Sul (2007) suggested that since µt is a common component
in Equation (14), it may be removed by scaling to obtain the relative transition or loading
coefficient,
hi,t =
yi,t
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi,t
=
δi,t
1
N
N∑
i=1
δi,t
, (17)
which measures the loading coefficient, δi,t, relative to the panel average at time t. Intuitively,
the relative transition parameter hi,t traces out a transition path for country i in relation
to the panel average at time t. By definition, the cross sectional mean of hi,t is unity.
In addition, the relative transition parameters hi,t converge to unity if the factor loading
coefficients, δi,t, converge to δ. In this case, the cross sectional variance of hi,t in the long
run converges to zero, so that
σ2t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(hi,t − 1)2 → 0 as t→∞. (18)
To formulate a null hypothesis of convergence, Phillips and Sul (2007) use a semipara-
metric model for the loading coefficients δi,t
δi,t = δi + σi,tξi,t, σi,t =
σi
L(t)tα
, t ≥ 1, σi > 0 for all i, (19)
where δi is fixed, ξi,t is iid(0, 1) across i, and L(t) is a slowly varying functions such as log t
that vary over i, and α governs the speed at which the cross sectional variation decays to zero
over time. This formulation ensures that δi,t converges to δi for all α ≥ 0. If this condition
holds and δi = δj for i 6= j, the model allows for transitional periods in which δi,t 6= δj,t,
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thereby incorporating any potential transitional heterogeneity across i. The conditions for
convergence in the model can be summarized as
lim
t→∞
δi,t = δ iff δi = δ and α ≥ 0,
lim
t→∞
δi,t 6= δ iff δi 6= δ and α < 0.
(20)
The null and alternative hypotheses of convergence can now be formulated as
H0 : δi = δ and α ≥ 0,
HA : δi 6= δ and α < 0.
(21)
To test the null hypothesis of convergence, first, Phillips and Sul (2007) constructed the
cross sectional variance ratio, H1/Ht, where Ht is defined as
Ht =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(hi,t − 1)2 , hi,t = yi,t
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi,t
. (22)
H1 represents the variation at the beginning of the sample and Ht represents the variation
for (t = 1, . . . , T ). Second, run the following log t regression
log
(
H1
Ht
)
− 2 log(log t) = aˆ+ bˆ log t+ uˆt, for t = [rT ], [rT ] + 1, . . . T with r > 0. (23)
In Equation (23), as recommended by Phillips and Sul (2007), the data for this regression
start at the integer part of t = [rT ], where r = 0.3, so the first r% of the data is dis-
carded. The term −2 log(log t) serves as penalty function.31 The fitted coefficient of log t
is bˆ = 2 αˆ, where αˆ is the estimate of α in H0. Finally, the t-statistic is constructed using
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. By using the con-
ventional t-statistic tbˆ, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected if tbˆ < −1.65 at the 5
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percent level.
3.1.3. Club clustering
Rejection of overall convergence does not rule out the possibility of club convergence. Ac-
cordingly, to investigate the possibility of a club convergence patterns, Phillips and Sul (2007)
proposed a clustering algorithm test procedure. In this section, I briefly outline the basic
steps for implementing the clustering procedure.
Step 1 (cross-section ordering): Order the countries according to the last observation in
the panel.
Step 2 (core group formation): Identify a core group of countries that converge by select-
ing the first k highest countries in the panel to form the subgroup Gk for some N > k ≥ 2
and then run the log t regression and compute the convergence test statistic tk = t(Gk) for
this subgroup. Choose the core group size k∗ by maximizing tk over k; that is, keep adding
countries to the core group until the null hypothesis of the log t test is rejected. If the
condition t(Gk < 1.65) does not hold for the k = 2 then the highest country in Gk can be
dropped from each subgroup. Continue identifying additional subgroups within the entire
panel.
Step 3 (club membership) Let Gck∗ be a complementary set to the core group Gk∗. Add
one country at a time from Gck∗ to the core group with k∗ members identified in (Step 2)
and then run the log t regression. Let tˆ be the corresponding t statistic. Include the new
country in the convergence club if the corresponding t-statistic tˆ is greater than c, where
c ≥ 0 is some chosen critical value.
Step 4 (recursion and stopping): Form a subgroup from the countries not selected in the
club formed in Step 3. Run the log t test for this set of countries to see if this complement
group satisfies the convergence test. If it converges, then these countries form a second
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convergence club, so that we have two convergence clubs. If not, Step 1 through Step 3 is
repeated to see if there is evidence of subconvergence clusters in this second group. If no
core group is found (Step 2), then these countries exhibit divergent behavior.
3.2. Linear dynamic model
In this section, I investigate whether the growth effect of FDI differs substantially across
more homogenous group of countries. I use linear dynamic growth model to explore the
FDI-finance-growth relationship across convergence clubs. To test for potential coefficient
changes across clubs, within each group of countries, I estimate the following cross-country
growth equation:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α− 1)yi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + µi + εi,t. (24)
where yi,t is the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, and Xi,t is a set of
explanatory variables, including FDI, average years of schooling, government consumption
expenditure, inflation rate, and trade openness, µi represents time invariant country-specific
effect, and εi,t denotes the idiosyncratic shocks.
32 All variables, with the exception of in-
flation, are transformed into logarithms. “Too much” finance implies that the estimated
coefficient for FDI will be less positive in the clubs with larger average level of financial
development. To obtain efficient, unbiased, and consistent estimates of the effect of FDI
on growth, I use the system dynamic panel GMM estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998).33 This dynamic panel estimator has a number of advantages
over cross-sectional estimators. First, the system dynamic panel GMM estimator addresses
the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Second, it accounts for the biases
induced by including lagged or initial income in the growth equation. Third, unlike pure
cross-sectional instrumental variable estimators, dynamic panel GMM estimator exploits the
time series variation and controls for unobserved country-specific effect.
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Rewrite Equation (24) as
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + β′Xi,t + µi + εi,t. (25)
To eliminate the unobserved country-specific effects, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano
and Bond (1991) suggest to first-difference Equation (25) as follows:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β′(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (εi,t − εi,t−1). (26)
By construction, in Equation (26), the differenced lagged dependent variable (yi,t−1−yi,t−2) is
correlated with the new error term (εi,t−εi,t−1): the former contains yi,t−1 and the latter, now
an MA(1) process, contains εi,t−1. To address this correlation and the potential endogeneity
of the explanatory variables, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using the lagged levels of
the explanatory variables as instruments under the assumptions that the error term, ε, is
not serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous34. Under
these assumptions, this dynamic panel estimator, commonly referred to as difference GMM
estimator, uses the following moment conditions:
E[yi,t−l(εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, . . . , T. (27)
E[Xi,t−l(εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, . . . , T. (28)
The difference GMM estimator, however, has conceptual and statistical shortcomings.
For example, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) demon-
strated that persistence in the lag dependent and explanatory variables makes lagged levels
of these variables weak instruments for the differenced variables and this may adversely
affect the small-sample and asymptotic properties of the difference GMM estimator. To
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address this weak instrument problem and to improve efficiency, Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the system GMM estimator. The system GMM
estimator augments the difference estimator by jointly estimating the regression in differ-
ences and the regression in levels. The two equations are distinctly instrumented. While the
instruments for the regression in differences are the lagged levels of the explanatory variables
(same as above), the instruments for the equation in levels are the lagged differences of the
explanatory variables.
These instruments are valid under the additional assumption that the correlation between
the country-specific effect, µi, and the levels of the explanatory variables is time-invariant,
such that
E[yi,t+pµi] = E[yi,t+qµi] and E[Xi,t+pµi] = E[Xi,t+qµi] for all p and q. (29)
Given this assumption, there is no correlation between the country-specific effect, µi, and
the differences of the explanatory variables. This assumption implies, for example, that any
correlation between FDI or financial development and the country-specific effect is constant
over time. Thus, the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are valid instruments
for the equation in levels, and the additional moment conditions for the regression in levels
are:
E[(yi,t−l − yi,t−l−1)(µi + εi,t)] = 0 for l = 1 (30)
E[(Xi,t−l −Xi,t−l−1)(µi + εi,t)] = 0 for l = 1. (31)
The system GMM thus consists of regressions in differences and levels stacked together. The
system GMM estimator uses the moment conditions in Equations (27), (28), (30) and (31) to
obtain consistent and efficient estimates. The moment conditions in Equations (27) and (28)
are used in the first part of the system (regressions in differences) while the moment condi-
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tions in Equations (30) and (31) are used in the second part of the system (regressions in
levels). As with other GMM estimators, the system GMM have one- and two-step variants.
Although asymptotically more efficient and robust to heteroscedasticity, the two-step sys-
tem GMM estimation of the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased in finite
samples. To eliminate this potential bias, I use the finite sample correction for the two-step
covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).35
The consistency of the system GMM estimator relies on the validity of the instruments
and the assumption that the error term, ε, is not serially correlated. Although, by construc-
tion, the residuals in first differences (AR(1)) are likely to be serially correlated, there should
be no second-order, AR(2), serial correlation. I use two specification tests proposed by Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to test these two assumptions. Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions is used to test the overall validity of the instruments.36
The second test examines the hypothesis that the differenced error term is not second-order
serially correlated.3738 Also, Roodman (2009) observed that instrument proliferation can
result in biased parameter estimates. To reduce this instrument count problem, I “collapse”
the instrument matrix in order to keep the number of instruments far below the number
of countries.39 In summary, I estimate the cross-country growth model using the two-step
system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction for the covariance
matrix.
3.3. Dynamic panel threshold model
To examine whether there is a common financial development threshold beyond which the
positive effect of FDI on economic growth changes in magnitude, I use a dynamic panel
threshold technique by Kremer et al. (2013) to test for threshold effect in the FDI-finance-
growth relationship for each club.40 This method extends the original model by Hansen
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(1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004) to allow for endogenous regressors in a panel frame-
work. If financial development plays a role in mediating the growth effect of FDI, regression
functions will differ across clubs. The dynamic panel threshold model of the FDI-finance-
growth nexus takes the following form:
Growth = µi + β1FDIi,tI(FINi,t ≤ γ) + δI(FINi,t ≤ γ)
+ β2FDIi,tI(FINi,t > γ) + ψ
′Xi,t + εi,t
(32)
where Growth is the growth rate of real per capita GDP in country i at time t, µi is the
country-specific fixed effect, γ is the threshold level, and the error term is εi,t
i.i.d∼ (0, σ2).
I(·) is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if the argument in the indicator function
holds, and 0 otherwise. The threshold variable, FINi,t, divides the sample into regimes
with differing regression slope parameters β1 and β2. The level of financial development
measured by private credit is used as the threshold variable. Xi,t is a vector of explanatory
variables which can be partitioned into a subset of exogenous variables (X1i,t = schooling,
government expenditure, inflation rate, trade openness) uncorrelated with εi,t, and a sub-
set of endogenous variable (X2i,t = real per capita GDP from previous period) correlated
with εi,t. Allowing for differences in the regime intercept helps minimize any potential bias in
both the threshold and the corresponding marginal effect estimates. Following Bick (2010),
I include a threshold intercept, δ.41 All variables, with the exception of inflation and growth,
are transformed into logarithms.
Since the threshold level, γ, is not known a priori, it must be estimated. The esti-
mation procedure involves eliminating the country-specific fixed effects µi using a fixed-
effect transformation method. In a dynamic panel threshold model, however, the traditional
within-transformation and first differencing methods of removing individual effects leads to
inconsistent estimates as it violates the distributional assumptions underlying the threshold
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model by Hansen (1999). Thus, the forward orthogonal deviations transformation method
by Arellano and Bover (1995) is used to eliminate the country-specific fixed effects.42 The
estimation procedure by Caner and Hansen (2004) can then be applied to Equation (32).43
Following Caner and Hansen (2004), the parameters are estimated sequentially. First, I
run a reduced-form regression of the endogenous variable X2,it on a set of instruments Z1,it,
including all exogenous regressors X1i,t. I then obtain the predicted values Xˆ2,it. Second,
in Equation (32), I replace X2,it with Xˆ2,it and obtain the least square estimates for a fixed
threshold γ. Let S(γ) denote the resulting sum of squared residuals. For a strict subset of
the support of FINi,t, I repeat this second step. Observe that, since the slope parameters
depend on the threshold value, the sum of squared errors (SSE) for Equation (32) which is
also a function of the threshold value is a step function, with the steps occurring at some
well-defined values of the threshold variable FINi,t. Conditioning on a threshold value,
however, SSE is linear in the parameters and minimization will yield the conditional OLS
estimates for β1 and β2. Finally, the estimator of the threshold corresponds to the value of
γ that produces the smallest sum of squared residuals. That is, the minimizer of the sum of
squared residuals: γˆ = argmin
γ
Sn(γ).
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Let C(α) be the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio
statistic LR(γ), then the critical values for determining the 95 percent confidence interval
of the threshold value are given by Γ = {γ : LR(γ) ≤ C(α)} (Hansen, 1999; Caner and
Hansen, 2004). Once the sample-splitting threshold estimate γˆ is obtained, the sample can
be divided into subsamples and, on each subsample, the slope parameters β1 and β2 can
be estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM). Lags of the dependent variable
are used as instruments. Given the bias-efficiency tradeoff in finite sample, empirical results
based on GMM may depend on the number of instruments (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman,
2009). Therefore, in estimation, I use different lag lengths. To avoid potential overfitting,
I use a lag length of one, and to increase efficiency, I use all available lags as instruments.
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However, the choice of instruments did not have any significant effect on the main results.
In the results reported in this paper, I use an instrument count of two.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Transition curves and convergence clubs
There is a reasonable prior support for heterogeneous technological progress across countries.
Thus, there is the possibility of diverse patterns of economic transition. As a starting exercise,
I provide some graphical illustrations of the relative transition curves and the different phases
of transition in the data.45 Figure 3 shows the relative transition parameters for log private
credit (top panel) and log real per capita GDP (bottom panel) in the 62 countries over
the period 1984-2016.46 It can be seen from Figure 3 that the relative transition curves
display considerable heterogeneity. There appears to be no clear evidence supporting overall
convergence since the relative transition curves show minimal reduction in dispersion over
the sample period. In general, the pattern of economic transition and convergence can vary
across countries or groups of countries. However, from Figure 3, visually identifying such
potential distinctions appears impossible. As a result, to evaluate the transition curves and
to shed light on convergence and convergence clustering, I use the log t convergence test.
Table 7 reports the results of applying the log t test to the full panel and four different
subsamples. The table reports the point estimates, bˆ, and the corresponding t-statistics, tbˆ,
from estimating the log t regression equation (Equation (23)). I estimate two separate log
t regressions, one using log private credit and the other using log real per capita GDP. For
the full sample, the null hypothesis of overall financial development convergence is rejected
at the 5% level (tbˆ = −5.776). Similarly, the null hypothesis of overall income convergence is
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rejected at the 5% level (tbˆ = −18.617). Consistent with the observations from the relative
transition curves in Figure 3, these results suggest that there is little evidence of overall
financial development or income convergence among the 62 countries.
A substantial body of literature tends to use conventional classification of countries to ex-
amine heterogeneity. To examine convergence among members of these conventional groups,
I perform separate analysis for each subsample. I apply the log t test to high income, middle
income, OECD, and Non-OECD subsamples. Table 7 shows the log t test results for each
group. The null hypothesis of overall financial development convergence is rejected for the
high income and Non-OECD subsamples at the 5% level. However, for the middle income
and OECD subsamples, there is some evidence of financial development convergence as we
fail to reject the null hypothesis. With respect to income convergence, the point estimates,
bˆ, are all negatives and the corresponding t-statistics tbˆ are large enough so that, at the 5%
level, the null hypothesis of income convergence is consistently rejected in each subsample.
In sum, there is little evidence of financial development or income convergence among mem-
ber countries of these conventional groups, suggesting that these conventional classification
of countries may not be the ideal way to capture the potential differential growth effect of
FDI.
Given the lack of overall convergence and the fact that conventional subgroups of countries
are not necessarily convergence clubs, to examine the FDI-finance-growth relationship within
and across a more homogeneous group of countries, I apply the clustering algorithm proposed
by Phillips and Sul (2007) to investigate the possibility of a club convergence pattern among
the 62 countries. This method allows for transitional dynamics and individual heterogeneity
and thus avoid ad hoc sample splitting.
Table 8 shows the club convergence results from applying the clustering procedures to
the private credit panel of 62 countries. Based on private credit, the algorithm classifies the
country data into two convergence clubs. In each club, the fitted log t regression coefficient is
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significantly positive, revealing evidence of convergence. Club 1 consists of 51 countries while
Club 2 is made up of 11 countries. Club 1 contains the most financially developed countries.
The average private credit over the sample period is higher in Club 1 (72%) than in Club
2 (26%). In addition, the average real per capita GDP over the sample period is higher
in Club 1 (≈ $20,577) than in Club 2 (≈ $4,401). Figure 4 shows the relative transition
parameters for Club 1 (top panel) and Club 2 (bottom panel). The relative transition curves
in each club appear to narrow toward unity toward the end of the sample period, supporting
convergence.
Table 9 shows the club convergence results from the convergence test for real per capita
GDP for the panel of 62 countries. Initially, the algorithm classifies the country data into
six convergence clubs and a divergent group consisting of two countries. The fitted log t
regression coefficient is significantly positive for clubs 1 through 6, revealing an evidence
supporting club classification. However, the fitted coefficient is significantly negative for
Group 7 and so the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected. In the middle panel of
Table 9, I test for potential club merging. As seen in Table 9, with the exception of Clubs
2, 3, and 4, there appears to be no evidence supporting club merging. Hence, as shown in
the right panel (‘Final classification’), Clubs 1, 5, 6, and the aggregate of Clubs 2, 3, and 4
are considered to form separate convergence clubs. Table 10 displays the final four income
convergence clubs, one divergent group, and member countries. The average private credit
over the sample period is highest in Club 1 (106%) and lowest in Club 4 (22%). Similarly,
the average real per capita GDP over the sample period is highest in Club 1 and decreases
through Club 4. Figure 5 shows the relative transition parameters for Club 1 through Club
3.47 The relative transition curves in each club show noticeable reduction in dispersion and
appear to narrow toward unity at the end of the sample period, supporting convergence.
In sum, the results based on the convergence test show no evidence supporting a sin-
gle long run equilibrium. However, there is some evidence of convergence clustering among
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two different financial development convergence clubs and four different income clubs. An
important feature from the clustering analysis is that club members are not necessarily ge-
ographically neighboring, and neither does income convergence necessarily imply financial
development convergence. The goal of this paper is to explore the FDI-finance-growth re-
lationship within and across convergence clubs. While, in this paper, I explore the general
characteristics of the FDI-finance-growth relationship within and across convergence clubs,
I do not examine the many possible determining factors in each club.
4.2. Linear dynamic model
In this section, I examine the relationship between FDI and economic growth for each con-
vergence club. To test for potential coefficient changes across convergence clubs, within each
club of countries, I estimate the linear dynamic model Equation (24) using the two-step
system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction. The data used
for the estimation are averaged over 3-year non-overlapping periods. Table 11 presents these
results. For comparison purposes, I also report the results for the full sample of 62 countries.
The estimated coefficient of FDI for the full sample is significantly positive at the 1% level,
suggesting that FDI has direct effect on growth. Regarding the two financial development
clubs, the estimated coefficients of FDI for both clubs are significantly positive. However,
the coefficient appears to be substantially lower in for Club 1 than in Club 2. The coeffi-
cient difference is statistically significant at 5% level. Similarly, for the three income clubs,
the coefficient of FDI increases as we move from Club 1 to Club 3. In income Club 1, the
coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero. The coefficient for Club 3 (0.735)
is also significantly positive but appears larger in magnitude than that in Club 2 (0.139).
Also, relative to the full sample, the growth effect of FDI in Club 2 is larger but smaller in
Club 1.
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As a sensitivity analysis, Table 12 presents the estimation results from Equation (24)
using 5-year average data. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in Table 11.
With the exception of income Club 2, the estimated coefficient in each club is significantly
positive albeit it differs across clubs. As seen in Tables 11 and 12, the estimated coefficient
of initial income is mostly negative. This is consistent with β-convergence. All the other
explanatory variables have the expected signs whenever significant. Also, the Arellano-Bond
serial correlation test shows that there is no second-order serial correlation while the Hansen
instrument validity test shows the instruments are not correlated with the error term.
Overall, the growth effect of FDI displays heterogeneity across convergence clubs, appear-
ing to be smaller in clubs with higher average financial development. The results point to the
presence of potential nonlinearity or threshold effects in the FDI-finance-growth relationship.
The implication is that more finance is not always better. The more financially developed a
country is, the smaller the effect of FDI on growth. In addition, the level of development of a
country matters. These findings are consistent with the diminishing returns effects observed
in the literature (see, for example, Rioja and Valev, 2004a,b; Aghion et al., 2005; Shen and
Lee, 2006; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2015).
4.3. Dynamic panel threshold model
To test for the existence of a common financial development threshold beyond which the
positive effect of FDI on economic growth changes in magnitude, Table 13 presents the
estimates from the dynamic panel threshold model (Equation (32)) for the full sample and
the two financial development clubs. Each column shows the coefficient from a separate
regression using 3-year average data.48 Private credit is used as the threshold variable.
To examine the sensitivity of the benchmark results, following the literature (Levine et al.,
2000; Beck et al., 2000), for each club, I report estimates using “simple” conditioning set that
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includes only the logarithm of initial income and educational attainment. The first row of
Table 13 displays the estimated financial development threshold values and the corresponding
95% confidence intervals. The slope parameter estimates, βˆ1 and βˆ2, denote the regime-
dependent marginal effects of FDI on growth.
The point estimate of the threshold value for Club 1 is 92.58% of GDP with a 95% confi-
dence interval lying between 83.75% and 97.49%. The literature on the FDI-finance-growth
relationship has not considered the upper financial development threshold effects, thus lim-
iting comparisons. Regarding the regime-dependent marginal effects, FDI has significantly
positive effect on economic growth if private credit is less than the threshold. Above the
threshold value, however, FDI appears to have no significant effect on growth. This is
consistent with the diminishing returns effects in the development of financial sector. The
threshold value remains unchanged albeit the marginal effects are relatively larger when the
“simple” conditioning set is used for the estimation. For Club 2, the point estimate of the
threshold value is 10.95% of GDP and the 95% confidence interval lies between 10.43% and
17.07%.
In contrast to Club 1, in Club 2, FDI has significantly positive effect on economic growth
if private credit is greater than the threshold. However, below this threshold value, FDI
appears to have no significant effect on growth. The results remain robust to the “simple”
conditioning set. This suggest that a minimum level of financial development threshold is
required for FDI to have positive effect on economic growth of a country. Rioja and Valev
(2004a) find that finance has positive effect on growth when private credit to GDP is greater
than 14%. Notice that when Club 1 and Club 2 are pooled together (full sample), one
threshold value exist. By separating the full sample into clubs, two thresholds values are
identified, lower and upper thresholds. All the “policy covariates are plausibly signed where
significant.
For further robustness checks, I reestimate the model using 5-year average data. The
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results are reported in Table 14. The results are qualitatively similar to the results obtained
using 3-year average data. In particular, I find both upper and lower thresholds. Moving
away from the financial development convergence clubs, I estimate the model for each in-
come convergence club using 3-year average data. Table 15 presents the estimates from the
dynamic panel threshold model (Equation (32)) for the three income clubs. I find evidence
of threshold effects in Clubs 1 and 2. In Club 1, the point estimate of the threshold value
is 53.96% [43.59-108.08%] and the slope estimates are both positive and statistically signif-
icant. However, above the threshold, the effect of FDI on growth is smaller. The threshold
value for Club 2 is 92.58% of GDP with a 95% confidence interval lying between 88.06% and
100.47%. FDI appears to have no significant effect on growth above the threshold value but
the effect is positive and statistically significant below the threshold. There is no evidence of
threshold effect in Club 3. Unlike the threshold analysis based on the financial development
clubs, the confidence intervals in the case of the income clubs are wide and tend to overlap.
The empirical findings point to the presence of threshold effects in the FDI-finance-growth
relationship. The positive effect of FDI on economic growth kicks in only after a country
achieves a minimum level of financial development threshold. But there is also a financial
development threshold beyond which the growth effect of FDI becomes negligible. These
results are consistent with the diminishing returns effects in the development of financial
sector (see, for example, Rioja and Valev, 2004a; Shen and Lee, 2006; Rousseau and Wachtel,
2011; Beck et al., 2014; Herwartz and Walle, 2014; Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015).
5. Conclusion
The consensus in the empirical macro literature is that the growth benefit of FDI is not
automatic but conditional on host country policies and environments, including financial
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sector development. The goal of this paper is to explore the FDI-finance-growth relationship
within and across convergence clubs. For this purpose, I first apply the log t regression
test for convergence and clustering proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to examine whether
countries converge to a single long run equilibrium. In the second part, I examine whether the
growth effect of FDI differs across convergence clubs using the two-step system generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction.
In addition, I test for threshold effect in the FDI-finance-growth relationship for each club
using a dynamic panel threshold technique. The empirical analysis is based on a panel of 62
middle and high income countries spanning the period 1987-2016.
I find evidence of convergence clustering among two different clubs based on financial
development and four different clubs based on real per capita GDP. Overall, the growth
effect of FDI displays substantial heterogeneity across convergence clubs, appearing to be
smaller in clubs with higher average financial development. In addition, to a larger extent,
the level of development of a country matters. The results also point to the presence of
threshold effects. The positive effect of FDI on economic growth kicks in only after a country
achieves a minimum level of financial development threshold. But there is also a financial
development threshold beyond which the growth effect of FDI becomes negligible. These
results are consistent with the diminishing returns effects in the development of financial
sector.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on structural and policy related condi-
tions that can affect the relationship between FDI inflows and economic growth by showing
that heterogeneity and nonlinearity matter in this relationship. The findings from this paper
suggest that at low levels of financial development, improving domestic financial sector con-
ditions can help host economies maximized the growth benefit of FDI. However, consistent
with the diminishing returns effects in the development of financial sector, the growth effect
of FDI tends to decline as a country becomes more financially developed, suggesting that
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more finance is not always better. In addition, to accurately examine the role of financial
development in mediating the potential growth benefit of FDI, it is important for researchers
and policymakers to allow for cross-country differences in financial development.
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Notes
1The interaction between downstream and upstream firms is called the backward linkage channel. That is,
interaction between the upstream domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs and their multinational clients.
Domestic firms, through backward linkage channel, may obtain free knowledge transfer by being a supplier
of intermediate input to multinational firms. By having a foreign upstream firms and gaining access to less
costly intermediate inputs from foreign suppliers, domestic firms may become more productive - forward
linkage channel.
2I use bank-based financial development because using stock-market-based measures reduce the sample
substantially.
3For the financial institution index, 2014 was the most recent year of data available at the time of the
analysis
4The 3-year non-overlapping periods are 1987-1989, 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-
2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2013, and 2014-2016.
5Top half sample includes the 31 most financially developed countries with average level of private credit
to GDP over the sample period exceeding 50 percent. The average level of private credit to GDP for the
bottom half is 50 percent or less.
6In estimating Equation (1), I control for time-specific effect and any potential cross-sectional dependence
by using cross-sectionally demeaned data for all variables.
7See Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond
(1998), and Roodman (2009) for a detailed description of the system dynamic panel GMM estimator.
8The explanatory variables are uncorrelated with future error terms.
9See Roodman (2009) for details.
10The null hypothesis is that the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are not correlated with
the error term.
11The null hypothesis is that there is no second-order serial correlation.
12A consistent system GMM estimator fails to reject both null hypotheses.
13I use the “collapse” option in the xtabond2 STATA command. See Roodman (2009) for details.
14I do not use quadratic specification since it places a specific functional form on the nonlinearity regardless
of the patterns in the data. Unlike other nonlinear models such as spline and quadratic regressions, the
threshold model does not impose any specific functional form on the nonlinearity aspect of the model.
15Including time dummies to control for time-fixed effect did not change the main results.
16The forward orthogonal deviations transformation subtracts the average of all future available observa-
tions of a variable from each observation. This ensures the error terms are not correlated. See Kremer et al.
(2013).
17I thank Alexander Bick for making the MATLAB code for the dynamic panel threshold estimation
available online at https://alexbick.weebly.com/publications.html.
18This minimization problem can be reduced to searching over values of γ up to nT distinct values of
FINi,t in the sample.
19The results are robust to using 5-year averages and are available upon request.
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20The World Bank defines middle income countries as those with a GNI per capita between $1,026 and
$12,475 and high income countries as those with a GNI per capita of $12,476 or more.
21Private credit enters the model as log(private credit + 1).
22A multinational corporation would often rely on host-country financing in order to minimize overall cost
of capital, reduce exposure to exchange rate risk, and gain access to liquid funds that would otherwise be
tied up. Also, multinational firms tend to adjust the scale of operations when local financial institutions
are more developed. See, for example, (Alfaro et al., 2004; Bilir et al., 2014) for anecdotal and systematic
evidence.
23In a survey of 72 empirical macro studies on the growth effect of FDI, Bruno and Campos (2013) observe
that 50 percent of the studies find positive growth effect, 11 percent find negative effect while 39 percent
find no relationship between FDI and growth. For the 103 micro studies, the authors find 44 percent of the
estimates are significantly positive, 44 percent are insignificant while 12 percent are significantly negative.
24Backward linkage involves the interaction between domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs and multi-
national clients in downstream sectors while forward linkage occurs between foreign suppliers of intermediate
inputs and domestic clients in upstream sectors.
25I use the term income convergence and growth convergence interchangeably in this paper.
26Net FDI inflows measure the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting interest (the foreign investor
holds at least 10 percent or more of a local firms equity) in an enterprise operating in an economy outside
of the investor’s.
27Bank-based financial development are used because using stock-market-based measures reduce the sam-
ple substantially.
28The 3-year non-overlapping periods are 1987-1989, 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, 2002-
2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2013, and 2014-2016.
29The unconditional OLS β coefficient estimate for the full sample is -0.009 with a standard error of 0.003.
30The World Bank defines middle-income countries as those with a GNI per capita between $1,026 and
$12,475 and high-income countries as those with a GNI per capita of $12,476 or more.
31For example, under the alternative hypothesis of club convergence, this penalty term gives the test
discriminatory power between overall convergence and club convergence.
32In estimating Equation (24), I control for time-specific effect and any potential cross-sectional dependence
by using cross-sectionally demeaned data for all variables.
33See Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond
(1998), and Roodman (2009) for a detailed description of the system dynamic panel GMM estimator.
34The explanatory variables are uncorrelated with future error terms.
35See Roodman (2009) for details.
36The null hypothesis is that the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are not correlated with
the error term.
37The null hypothesis is that there is no second-order serial correlation.
38A consistent system GMM estimator fails to reject both null hypotheses.
39I use the “collapse” option in the xtabond2 STATA command. See Roodman (2009) for details.
40I do not use quadratic specification since it places a specific functional form on the nonlinearity regardless
of the patterns in the data. Unlike other nonlinear models such as spline and quadratic regressions, the
threshold model does not impose any specific functional form on the nonlinearity aspect of the model.
41Including time dummies to control for time-fixed effect did not change the main results.
42The forward orthogonal deviations transformation subtracts the average of all future available observa-
tions of a variable from each observation. This ensures the error terms are not correlated. See Kremer et al.
(2013).
43I thank Alexander Bick for making the MATLAB code for the dynamic panel threshold estimation
available online at https://alexbick.weebly.com/publications.html.
44This minimization problem can be reduced to searching over values of γ up to nT distinct values of
FINi,t in the sample.
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45I used the Stata codes provided by Du (2017) to perform the econometric convergence analysis and club
clustering.
46Following Phillips and Sul (2007), I remove the business cycle components using the Hodrick-Prescott
smoothing filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
47Since the sample size is relatively small in Club 4 and Group 5, I restrict further empirical investigations
to Clubs 1, 2, and 3.
48The results are robust to using 5-year averages and are available upon request.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Real GDP per capita growth 620 0.021 0.024 -0.074 0.108
Log real GDP per capita 620 8.996 1.393 5.959 11.41
Foreign direct investment 620 0.032 0.05 -0.058 0.567
Domestic investment 620 0.221 0.052 0.085 0.433
Private credit 620 0.639 0.487 0.023 2.683
Bank credit 620 0.59 0.44 0.023 2.683
Liquid liabilities 620 0.636 0.383 0.093 2.39
Financial institutions index 620 0.48 0.241 0.076 0.999
Government consumption 620 0.155 0.051 0.038 0.333
Openness 620 0.785 0.507 0.136 4.173
Inflation 620 0.074 0.123 -0.045 1.021
Average years of schooling 620 7.448 2.852 1.09 13.42
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Figure 1. Average private credit to GDP and average FDI as a share of GDP, 1987-2016
Notes: Countries are ranked according to their average level of financial development measured by private credit to GDP over
the sample period and then split into bottom half and top half subsamples. Top half sample includes the 31 most financially
developed countries with average level of private credit to GDP over the sample period exceeding 50 percent. The average level
of private credit to GDP for the bottom half is 50 percent or less.
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Table 2. Correlation
Full sample Bottom half Top half
Growth FDI Growth FDI Growth FDI
FDI 0.179** 1 0.230** 1 0.185** 1
Private Credit -0.092** 0.259** -0.083 0.380** -0.239** 0.159**
Notes: Top half sample includes the 31 most financially developed countries with average level of private credit to GDP over
the sample period exceeding 50 percent. The average level of private credit to GDP for the bottom half is 50 percent or less.
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Table 3. Growth effect of FDI: split-sample regressions
Full sample Two-way split Three-way split
Bottom
half
Top half Bottom
third
Middle
third
Top third
Initial income -0.061*** -0.051** -0.129*** -0.009 -0.118*** -0.100***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.034)
FDI 0.163*** 0.234* 0.078*** 0.321*** 0.231*** 0.194
(0.058) (0.117) (0.021) (0.105) (0.053) (0.197)
Gov’t consumption -0.305*** -0.075 -0.689*** -0.076 -0.592*** -0.428*
(0.101) (0.099) (0.190) (0.099) (0.166) (0.235)
Openness 0.063*** 0.057* 0.079** 0.037 0.076 0.100**
(0.022) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.045) (0.046)
Inflation -0.053*** -0.040** -0.267*** -0.025* -0.135** -0.296***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.067) (0.013) (0.058) (0.066)
Schooling 0.027* 0.036 0.097** 0.016 0.101*** 0.002
(0.015) (0.021) (0.038) (0.019) (0.027) (0.037)
Observations 620 310 310 210 210 200
Number of countries 62 31 31 21 21 20
Hansen test (P value) 0.729 0.243 0.614 0.755 0.575 0.382
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.122 0.388 0.462 0.681 0.144 0.386
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression. The estimation method is two-step system GMM with
Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction. All variables are cross-sectionally demeaned log values. Windmeijer (2005)-
corrected cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% , 5%, and
10% level.
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Table 4. Growth effect of FDI and the level of financial development
Income group Interaction
Middle
income
High income Private credit Bank credit Liquid
liabilities
Initial income -0.047** -0.098*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.062***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
FDI 0.246** 0.084* 0.262*** 0.271*** 0.408***
(0.110) (0.044) (0.070) (0.075) (0.128)
Gov’t consumption -0.174** -0.396* -0.270*** -0.266** -0.235**
(0.079) (0.206) (0.100) (0.101) (0.103)
Openness 0.021 0.156*** 0.026 0.025 0.008
(0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Inflation -0.055*** -0.052* -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.046***
(0.016) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Schooling 0.028 0.020 0.028** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.026) (0.041) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
FDI*Private credit -0.614*
(0.342)
FDI*Bank credit -0.671*
(0.351)
FDI*Liquid liabilities -1.210**
(0.552)
F-statistic for FDI 7.60*** 7.55*** 5.77***
Observations 340 280 620 620 620
Number of countries 34 28 62 62 62
Hansen test (P value) 0.688 0.685 0.202 0.212 0.272
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.125 0.349 0.211 0.209 0.464
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression. The estimation method is two-step system GMM with
Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction. All variables are cross-sectionally demeaned log values. Windmeijer (2005)-
corrected cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. In column 3, the interaction is between FDI and private credit; it
is between FDI and bank credit in column 4; in column 5, it is between FDI and liquid liabilities. ***, **, and * indicates
statistical significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 5. Growth effects of FDI: dynamic threshold regression estimates
Private credit Bank credit Liquid liabilities Fin inst index
Threshold (γˆ) 92.582 83.773 91.203 0.607
[83.748-97.492] [83.021-97.148] [83.020-92.418] [0.569-0.641]
Impact of FDI
βˆ1FDII(FD ≤ γˆ) 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.209*** 0.282***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.043) (0.070)
βˆ2FDII(FD > γˆ) 0.033 0.025 0.086** 0.045
(0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.030)
Impact of covariates
Initial Income -0.025** -0.026** -0.026** -0.029**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Govt Consumption -0.217*** -0.218*** -0.228*** -0.261***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.072)
Openness 0.032** 0.033** 0.042*** 0.036**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Inflation -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.038***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Schooling 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
δˆ 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Countries 62 62 62 62
Observations 620 620 620 620
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicates statistical significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 6. Robustness: dynamic threshold regression estimates
Private credit Bank credit Liquid liabilities Fin inst index
Threshold (γˆ) 92.58 83.773 91.204 0.615
[83.748-96.511] [83.370-94.137] [83.185-95.255] [0.569-0.641]
Impact of FDI
βˆ1FDII(FD ≤ γˆ) 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.248*** 0.330***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.074)
βˆ2FDII(FD > γˆ) 0.040 0.033 0.109*** 0.062*
(0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.032)
Impact of covariates
Initial Income -0.024** -0.025** -0.024** -0.028**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Schooling 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.021
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
δˆ 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Countries 62 62 62 62
Observations 620 620 620 620
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicates statistical significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level.
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Figure 2. Growth of private credit and growth real per capita GDP
Notes: The left panel shows the relationship between initial log private credit and average growth rate of private credit for the
full sample. The right panel shows the relationship between initial log per capita GDP and average growth rate of per capita
GDP.
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Figure 3. Relative transition curves for the 62 countries
Notes: Relative transition curves for the 62 countries. The top panel shows the relative transition curves of log private credit
while the bottom panel shows the relative transition curves of log real per capita GDP.
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Table 7. Convergence tests
log private credit log real per capita GDP
Cases bˆ tbˆ bˆ tbˆ
Full sample (62) -0.271 -5.776 -0.439 -18.617
High income (28) -0.611 -27.599 -0.247 -11.105
Middle income (34) -0.034 -0.445 -0.481 -20.601
OECD (24) 0.253 3.683 -0.352 -21.197
Non-OECD (38) -0.176 -3.472 -0.468 -20.000
Notes: The columns report the point estimates bˆ and the corresponding t-statistics tbˆ from estimating log t regression model.
In the first two columns, log private credit is used while in columns (3) and (4), log real per capita GDP is used in the log t
test.
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Table 8. Convergence club classification: private credit
Club bˆ tbˆ Member countries Average private
credit
Average real per
capita GDP
Club 1 [51] 0.154 2.558 Australia, Austria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belize, Botswana,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Fiji, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea,
Rep., Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, Norway,
Panama, Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Singapore, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States
0.721 $20577.295
Club 2 [11] 0.295 1.494 Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Domini-
can Republic, Egypt, Arab Rep.,
Gabon, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Swaziland, Trinidad and To-
bago, Uruguay
0.258 $4401.070
Notes: The numbers in brackets stand for the number of countries in a club.
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Figure 4. Relative transition curves for by convergence clubs
Notes: Relative transition curves of log private credit for the two clubs. The top panel shows the relative transition curves for
countries in club 1 while the bottom panel shows the relative transition curves for countries in club 2.
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Table 9. Convergence club classification: real per capita GDP
Initial classification Tests of club merging Final classification
bˆ(tbˆ) bˆ(tbˆ) bˆ(tbˆ)
Club 1 [17] 0.228 Club 1+2 Club 1 [17] 0.228
(6.048) -0.111** (6.048)
Club 2 [13] 0.092 (-3.363) Club 2+3
(2.072) 0.027
Club 3 [6] 0.071 (0.639) Club 3+4 Club 2 [22] 0.040
(1.595) 0.082 (0.966)
Club 4 [3] 0.052 (1.937) Club 4+5
(0.999) -0.055**
Club 5 [15] 0.132 (-1.413) Club 5+6 Club 3 [15] 0.132
(2.900) -0.297** (2.900)
Club 6 [6] 1.334 (-9.708) Club 6+7 Club 4 [6] 1.334
(14.656) -0.063** (14.656)
Group 7 [2] -0.463 (-1.750) Group 5 [2] -0.463
(-6.706) (-6.706)
Notes: ** reject the null hypothesis of growth convergence at 5% level. The numbers in brackets stand for the number of
countries in a club. Initial clustering consist of six subconvergence clubs and a divergent group. Tests of club merging lead to
the final classification of four convergence clubs and a divergent group.
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Table 10. Convergence club classification: real per capita GDP
Club bˆ tbˆ Member countries Average private
credit
Average real per
capita GDP
Club 1 [17] 0.228 6.048 Australia, Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Japan, Korea, Rep.,
Netherlands, Norway, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad
and Tobago, United Kingdom,
United States
1.055 $42240.453
Club 2 [22] 0.040 0.966 Bahrain, Botswana, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Dominican Republic, France,
Greece, India, Israel, Italy,
Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama,
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey,
Uruguay
0.642 $14218.162
Club 3 [15] 0.132 2.900 Belize, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab
Rep., El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon,
Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Philippines, South Africa,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia
0.374 $3779.421
Club 4 [6] 1.334 14.656 Bangladesh, Cameroon, Cote
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Pakistan, Sene-
gal
0.218 $991.708
Group 5 [2] -0.463 -6.706 Guatemala, Honduras 0.311 $2162.452
Notes: The numbers in brackets stand for the number of countries in a club.
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Figure 5. Relative transition curves for by convergence clubs
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Table 11. Growth effect of FDI across clubs: System GMM estimates
Private credit Real per capita GDP
Full Club 1 Club 2 Club 1 Club 2 Club 3
Initial income -0.061*** -0.070*** -0.006 -0.118*** -0.092 -0.099**
(0.014) (0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.076) (0.038)
FDI 0.163*** 0.109** 0.449*** 0.087* 0.139** 0.735*
(0.058) (0.050) (0.133) (0.042) (0.064) (0.380)
Gov’t consumption -0.305*** -0.239* -0.576** -0.952*** -0.114 -0.057
(0.101) (0.142) (0.195) (0.244) (0.174) (0.218)
Openness 0.063*** 0.074** 0.028 0.131*** 0.029 -0.015
(0.022) (0.028) (0.109) (0.030) (0.079) (0.068)
Inflation -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.044 -0.298*** -0.069* -0.042
(0.015) (0.016) (0.065) (0.063) (0.037) (0.026)
Schooling 0.027* 0.026 0.013 0.080* 0.065 0.052
(0.015) (0.030) (0.038) (0.040) (0.109) (0.034)
Observations 620 510 110 170 220 150
Number of countries 62 51 11 17 22 15
Hansen test (p-value) 0.729 0.483 0.406 0.466 0.463 0.362
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.122 0.378 0.117 0.108 0.956 0.171
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression using 3-year average data. The estimation method is two-
step system GMM with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction. All variables are cross-sectionally demeaned log values.
Windmeijer (2005)-corrected cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance
at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 12. Robustness: Growth effect of FDI across clubs, system GMM estimates
Private credit Real per capita GDP
Full Club 1 Club 2 Club 1 Club 2 Club 3
Initial income -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.069** -0.082*** -0.094** -0.093***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.031) (0.015) (0.034) (0.017)
FDI 0.181* 0.142* 0.643** 0.077** 0.002 0.403*
(0.104) (0.082) (0.284) (0.036) (0.150) (0.201)
Gov’t consumption -0.158* -0.188** -0.186 -0.613*** -0.059 -0.022
(0.085) (0.086) (0.220) (0.146) (0.181) (0.112)
Openness 0.019 0.046* -0.086 0.096*** -0.002 -0.060
(0.026) (0.027) (0.070) (0.024) (0.072) (0.049)
Inflation -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.046 -0.313*** -0.055*** -0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.046) (0.054) (0.019) (0.013)
Schooling 0.040*** 0.031* 0.051 0.023 0.109 0.065**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.047) (0.033) (0.084) (0.026)
Observations 372 306 66 102 132 90
Number of countries 62 51 11 17 22 15
Hansen test (p-value) 0.424 0.594 0.381 0.345 0.344 0.360
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.662 0.352 0.714 0.665 0.353 0.627
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression using 5-year average data. The estimation method is two-
step system GMM with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction. All variables are cross-sectionally demeaned log values.
Windmeijer (2005)-corrected cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance
at the 1% , 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 13. Growth effects of FDI: dynamic threshold regression estimates
Full Club 1 Club 1 Club 2 Club 2
Threshold (γˆ) 92.582 92.582 92.582 10.948 8.985
[83.748-97.492] [83.748-97.492] [83.748-97.492] [10.431-17.068] [8.985-17.068]
Impact of FDI
βˆ1FDII(FD ≤ γˆ) 0.235*** 0.201*** 0.261*** -0.304 -0.343
(0.046) (0.050) (0.053) (0.286) (0.214)
βˆ2FDII(FD > γˆ) 0.033 0.029 0.039 0.640*** 0.613***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.218) (0.171)
Impact of covariates
Initial Income -0.025** -0.029* -0.026 0.031 0.014
(0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.033) (0.023)
Govt Consumption -0.217*** -0.199*** -0.393**
(0.069) (0.017) (0.205)
Openness 0.032** 0.048*** 0.027
(0.015) (0.017) (0.043)
Inflation -0.035*** -0.041*** 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.034)
Schooling 0.012 0.001 0.015 0.005 0.022
(0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.020)
δˆ 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.017 0.032**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.013)
Countries 62 51 51 11 11
Observations 620 510 510 110 110
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression using 3-year average data. Club formation is based on
private credit. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10%
level.
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Table 14. Robustness: Growth effects of FDI, dynamic threshold estimates
Full Club 1 Club 2
Threshold (γˆ) 95.617 95.617 17.756
[54.774-96.698] [87.600-103.077] [10.863-31.585]
Impact of FDI
βˆ1FDII(FD ≤ γˆ) 0.218*** 0.171*** 0.009
(0.044) (0.043) (0.423)
βˆ2FDII(FD > γˆ) -0.041 -0.048 0.842**
(0.034) (0.032) (0.345)
Impact of covariates
Initial Income -0.024** -0.027** 0.053
(0.012) (0.015) (0.048)
Govt consumption -0.151** -0.138** -0.356
(0.073) (0.071) (0.356)
Openness 0.004 0.022 0.033
(0.017) (0.018) (0.067)
Inflation -0.033*** -0.037*** 0.033
(0.010) (0.012) (0.044)
Schooling 0.013 0.003 0.001
(0.015) (0.021) (0.041)
δˆ 0.005 0.005 0.013
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018)
Countries 62 51 11
Observations 372 306 66
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression using 5-year average data. Club formation is based on
private credit. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% , 5%, and 10%
level.
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Table 15. Robustness: Dynamic threshold regression estimates
Club 1 Club 2 Club 3
Threshold (γˆ) 53.956 92.582 52.956
[43.590-108.082] [88.056-100.472] [8.670-56.918]
Impact of FDI
βˆ1FDII(FD ≤ γˆ) 0.494*** 0.318** 0.268
(0.159) (0.131) (0.193)
βˆ2FDII(FD > γˆ) 0.052** -0.053 0.056
(0.025) (0.121) (0.166)
Impact of covariates
Initial Income -0.064* -0.027 -0.003
(0.033) (0.045) (0.039)
Govt Consumption -0.846*** -0.066 -0.145
(0.128) (0.092) (0.182)
Openness 0.106*** 0.044 0.031
(0.030) (0.043) (0.026)
Inflation -0.296*** -0.02 -0.031***
(0.088) (0.019) (0.011)
Schooling 0.016 0.006 -0.009
(0.047) (0.078) (0.034)
δˆ 0.002 0.015* 0.013
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013)
Countries 17 22 15
Observations 170 220 150
Notes: Each column shows the coefficient from a separate regression using 3-year average data. Club formation is based on
real per capita GDP. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% , 5%, and
10% level.
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